ent cells in one week, it began to look like salvation for cold fusion.
After a year of ambiguous or simply negative experiments, Bockris Yet almost from the beginning, researchers familiar with Bockris's experiment, and not enamored ofcold fusion, have suggested that his data were perhaps too good and too easy. How was it that his group, within a month ofthe original cold fusion announcement, was able to produce tritium in quantities that no other U.S. researcher has come dose to, even when following Bockris's recipe exactly? Was it truly a fusion reaction, which would require rewriting nuclear physics? Was it some inadvertent contamination? Or was it something more insidious?
Perhaps inevitably, suspicions were raised almost from the first that the tritium in the A&M cells was put there by human hands. As time went on, even members of Bockris's group would express their doubts about the "miracles" that seemingly favored the team. Other researchers, both at A&M and at outside imstitutions, wamed that questions about possible fraud would have to be resolved before the results could be accepted.
But the response of the A&M researchers and administration to these concems was limited at best. Instead of taking positive steps to guard their results against fraud, Bockris and his co-workers principally offered arguments as to why they thought fraud was unlikely, sometimes exaggerating their case in the process. And the Texas A&M administration, although it has been aware of some faculty members' suspicions n producers. Fusion cells in the Bockris lab.
and has kept an eye on the tritium work, has done nothing past some preliminary ques- tioning.
The result is that after a year of experiments that most scientists view with a great deal of skepticism anyway, the A&M researchers are still haunted by this specter of possible fraud. Even Kevin Wolf, an A&M nuclear chemist who worked closely with Bockris on the tritium work, believes that fraud cannot be ruled out as an explanation for the tritium results, although he now believes that inadvertent contamination is to blame for his own results (see box, p. 1301 Packham's key evidence was the appearance of tritium in a cell, known as A7, on 28 April. With A7, Bockris had wanted to catch a cell in the act of producing tritium. The current on this one cell was cranked up for 12 hours, and four samples were taken, each several hours apart. When the samples were counted, Bockris's group had hit the jackpot. Not only did tritium appear in the cell that day, but the multiple assays caught the tritium increasing with time: From background levels at noon to slightly above background at 2 p.m., to 5 trillion tritium atoms in the evening and 7.6 trillion near midnight.
To these four points, Packham had drawn a smooth S-shaped curve, indicative of the kind of gradual effect common in chemical reactions. Bigeleisen was unimpressed.
"He had four data points," says Bigeleisen, "to which they drew this hysteresis curve. I said, 'Well, your data do not uniquely define that curve. I could equally well draw the following kind of graph through your data-go flat across at zero, until a point around 6 hours, go straight up with a step function and go flat across again.' At that point Kevin Wolf said, 'Jake, are you implying that someone spiked that sample?' And I said, 'Kevin, you said that. I would never say such a thing.' " Such spiking would be easy to do and difficult to detect. Anyone with access to a bottle of tritiated water-water with some of the hydrogen atoms replaced by tritium atoms-could remove a few drops of the radioactive water from the bottle with a syringe and inject it into the cells in seconds. real, that they simply could not take seriously the idea that one of their own colleagues would deliberately falsify data.
In Wolfs lab at the Cyclotron Institute. The Institute had no guards on nights or weekends. Anyone with the necessary keys could get in unquestioned and those keys had readily been given to Bockris's researchers so they could tend to the cells when necessary.
Bockris's group also took to presenting the protocol for cell A7-the cell that produced tritium while being monitored over a 12-hour period-as proof against the spiking accusations. But they would exaggerate the details to do so.
In October, for instance, at a workshop co-sponsored by the National Science Foundation buildup of tritium as a function of time, where four people were standing there the whole 12 hours in front of the cell when the samples were taken."
The reality was much less iron-clad. Kainthla had taken the third and fourth assays on A7, the only two that showed high tritium concentrations. These two were taken after hours, when the lab was empty. "If you think people were watching the cells all the time," Kainthla said, "that's not true. Watching the cell meant a person is in the lab, and once in a while [that person] came in and checked that the current was passing through the cell and nothing unusual was happening." And he added, "If you want to do some mischief, you don't need a couple of hours. You can do it in a very, very short period of time."
While Bockris continued running the same cells through the summer and fall, Martin and Wolf separately set about testing the "inadvertent" or "spot" contamination theory, which both considered the most probable explanation for the results. "The sudden appearance of tritium activity in the cells," as Wolf said later, "requires the tritium to be loaded in a component prior to the beginning of cell operation."
In late July, the university relocated Bockris's laboratory to a new wing in the chemistry building. Wolf had health physics personnel search the old lab for possible sources of tritium contamination. They gave it, Wolf said, "a clean bill of health." Wolf also recruited Packham and his colleague Jeff Wass to take shavings off the lab equipment. They tested them for tritium contamination and found none.
In 
This time, two of Martin's new cells were made from palladium donated by Bockris. With these, Martin wasn't satisfied with locking them away in his own lab. He took them home and ran them in his second bedroom to ensure that they couldn't possibly be sabotaged. Martin never saw tritium in any of his cells.
In the last week of September, two more cells came up positive-the first in nearly 3 months-and worries about spiking immediately resurfaced. One of the two cells was among Wolfs dozen, cell D6. It came up Mike Hall. "There's a very large burden on the accuser" to prompt an investigation. positive in front ofWolfs gamma ray detectors, but no gamma rays were seen, which indicated that no nuclear process had taken place. The other was one of Bockris's cells. Labeled cell 4, this one had been running since May and had just begun producing excess heat, as measured by Bockris's calorimetry. (This was the only cell in which the team saw both heat and tritium.)
Omo Velev, the Bulgarian physicist who had been doing the tritium assays with Kainthla, found the timing of the positive results suspicious. He had been away on vacation when the two cells came up hot. When he retumed and heard about the newest findings, he went to Bockris with his suspicions. In particular, he was uneasy about the correlation between the dates the cells came up hot and visits of funding agents from EPRI.
EPRI had sponsored fuel cell work at A&M for years. In 1989, for example, EPRI split $150,000 between the research of Bockris, Martin, and John Appleby. When cold fusion came along, EPRI quickly doubled this amount. In July, EPRI spent $25,000 on Bockris's new tritium counter.
In the autumn, A&M submitted a proposal to EPRI, requesting $1.4 million for the cold fusion research of Bockris, Wolf, and Appleby.
Between June and December, EPRI funding agents made two trips to A&M to discuss additional cold fusion funding. After tritium appeared in a cell the last week of May, during the Santa Fe meeting, no cells turned up hot until 3 July. On 5 July, Rocky Goldstein, the EPRI project manager for A&M, visited Bockris's lab, the first of the two visits. Then no tritium appeared for 3 months, nor did any EPRI officials.
On Once again, Velev took his worries to Bockris, in particular this latest coincidence: Packham sampling cells for the first time in months, and hitting two right offthe bat. As Velev remembers it, Bockris again dismissed his fears as irrational.
"I was getting depressed," said Velev. "I told him, 'Listen, I'm very suspicious about the results. I'm not convinced they're true. The timing is very suspicious.' He said, 'Well, okay, thank you for your consideration. I'll keep this in mind... . ' " A week later, Velev told Bockris he was leaving the group to work for Appleby, because Appleby would not make him work on cold fusion. While Bockris's responses to concerns about spiking were weak, the response of the Texas A&M administration was even weaker. Several administrators had been keeping an eye on the cold fusion research on campus and had been aware that spiking was a possible explanation for the tritium results. But they had decided there had been nothing that warranted official action, says Dean Fackler. After 27 November, however, Martin started to push the issue.
"I resisted for a long time the possibility that there was fraud going on at Texas A&M," Martin says. He had discounted the spiking theory because he believed Bockris and Wolf when they insisted that security at the Cyclotron was too tight for the three results there to have been due to spiking. But when he looked into that security, he found it considerably less than advertised. It would have been "easy" for someone to spike the cells there, he concluded.
Martin went to Mike Hall, head of the chemistry department, and voiced his suspicions. "I warned Hall that I thought there was a very good chance the experimental results were the result of fraud," Martin recalls. Hall then checked with Fackler about A&M's policy toward fraud.
At the time, the A&M administration was revising its fraud policy. The current version seemed to have no provision for an investigation without a faculty member willing to press the case. "I had to publicly act as an accuser," Martin says. Although Martin was seriously concerned about possibile fraud, he says, he felt that all the evidence was circumstantial. "I can't go before a committee and accuse anyone of scientific fraud when all I have is circumstantial evidence."
Fackler now took a closer look at the tritium results. A week earlier, he had received a memo from Bockris in which Bockris suggested that Fackler may wish to set up a committee to monitor the work. He did not do that, but he did query Dave Youngblood, director of the Cyclotron Institute, about security there. Youngblood agreed with Martin: Security on nights and weekends was nonexistent, and many people on campus had keys to the building.
Wolf insists that his lab in the basement, at least, where D6 had been running, was locked at all times and needed a different key. Lawson, however, who had been tend- without demanding a Grand Inquisitor. "That's been part of the problem-there's a very large burden on the accuser. We have to find someone who is willing to put his own reputation on the line."
Although Hall and Martin saw the draft policy as implying that an accuser was necessary, Duwayne Anderson, associate provost for research and graduate studies, says that is not the case. With enough evidence, the administration can set up a committee to investigate, he says.
Anderson added that he and Fackler and Hall have been following the tritium results closely to see if an inquiry was warranted. Last week, they met after hearing that Wolf had found light water-a possible sign of spiking-in an electrolyte sample left over from one of the Bockris cells that had produced a lot of tritium (see box). The result of the meeting: "I haven't quite passed the threshhold of being sure that we have enough evidence to go forward with an inquiry," Anderson said.
The A&M experience illustrates how tricky it can be dealing with possible fraud. A university must find a balance between making it too easy to start an investigation and making it too hard. One lesson here may be that demanding someone act as a formal accuser or whistle-blower is too restrictive. An even clearer lesson seems to be that a university should have a well-defined fraud policy in place before problems arise. Martin says, "Part of the problem ofwhy the university didn't do more is that it is just now coming up with a policy. There was officially told that its researchers couldn't have access to any Chinese pigs for at least 5 years.
Markert wants to try a technique he developed when he was at Yale University that might enable him to transfer selected traits from the Chinese animals into domestic swine far more quickly than conventional breeding techniques would allow (Science, 6 October 1978, p. 56). The attraction of Chinese pigs is that they have much larger litters than U.S. breeds-an average of 15 offspring per litter, compared with 10 for domestic breeds-and they reach sexual maturity much earlier. Markert says he is "outraged" that the three institutions are "monopolizing a scientific resource paid for in part by public funds." Says Markert: "It's clear they don't want anybody to compete with them."
Reg Gomes, dean of the College of Agriculture at Illinois, says the three institutions paid to bring the pigs into the United States last year under a carefully worked out contract and they decided it would be unwise to alter the arrangement now. (The ARS's share of the costs was, of course, federal money.) NC State had an opportunity to join the Chinese pig consortium when it was formed 2 years ago, Gomes says, but the university turned the offer down. "To reopen this now would not be productive," Gomes says.
Part of the reason for the tight controls over the animals, Gomes says, was to allay fears of pork producers that undesirable traits of 
